This article is uploaded and uploaded to the blog first. There is an unmodified honorific mention, so please ask for your understanding
Line three lines summary
1. The C-130 transport must have the elevator raised to accommodate tall cargoes in the cargo hold.
2. The captain puts the box in the joystick to see if it was troublesome to pull the joystick up the elevator
3. I forgot to put the box and tried to take off, but after a sharp rise, I stumbled down and all 11 passengers and three soldiers on the ground were killed
1. Incident Overview
The date and time of the accident: October 2, 2015, 12:16:19 am (local time in Afghanistan)
Point of Incident: Jalalabad Airport, Nangarhar, Afghanistan
Cause of Accident: Pilot Fault
Type of accident: crash after stall due to inability to control pilot
Passengers: 11 passengers (4 passengers, 7 passengers)
Deaths: 14 (11 passengers killed, 3 on ground)
Survivor: 0
From: Afghanistan Jalalabad Airport (جلال آباد)
Destination: Afghanistan Bagram Air Base (د بګرام هوائی ډګر)
2. Accident Information
<US Air Force C-130J super hercules photograph, not the accident>
Model: Lockheed Martin C-130J-30 Super Hercules (Lockheed Martin C-130J-30 Super Hercules)
Registration number: 08-3174
Date of production: January 2011
Reference: 4 years 9 months
Affiliation: US Air Force 317 Air Transport Group, 39th Transportation Flight Battalion
<사고 4년 반 전인 2011년 3월 2일, 호주 국제에어쇼에서 촬영된 사고기의 모습>
(출처: 위키피디아 커먼즈, Author: Robert Frola)
사고기의 기종은 록히드 마틴 사에서 제작한 록히드 C-130J-30 슈퍼 허큘리스로, 군용 수송기이다.
C-130J 슈퍼 허큘리스는 기존(1957년)에 군용 수송기로 개발된 C-130 허큘리스의 엔진, 조종실 등을 현대식으로 개량한 기종으로, 1999년에 출시되었다. (2019년 현재 최신 기종)
<C-130J 슈퍼 허큘리스의 조종실 사진>
<위는 C-130J 슈퍼 허큘리스, 아래는 사고기 기종인 C-130J-30 슈퍼 허큘리스>
사고기 기종인 C-130J-30 슈퍼 허큘리스는 이 C-130J의 동체를 약 4.6미터 연장시킨 기종으로 2002년에 출시되었다.
C-130J-30는 기존 C-130 허큘리스에 비해 순항속도가 약 100km/h 증가한 640km/h이며, 항속거리는 약 3,300km, 화물 최대적재 중량은 20톤, 최대이륙 중량은 74.4톤이다.
상당히 짧은 이륙활주 거리(1km 내외를 달리고 이륙가능)를 가지고 있고, 거친 모래 활주로에서도 이착륙이 가능하기 때문에 열악한 환경에서도 운용이 가능한다.
C-130J는 2018년 기준으로 약 400대가 생산되었으며, 주로 미 공군, 미 해병대, 영국 왕립공군과 인도 공군에서 운용하고 있다. 대한민국 공군에서도 도입하여 운용하고 있다.
<2011년 4월 1일 호주 국제에어쇼에서 촬영된 사고기>
사고기(미 공군 등록번호: 08-3174)는 2011년 1월에 록히드 마틴 사에서 제작되어 1월 22일에 미 공군에 인수되었으며, 미국 텍사스 다이스에 위치한 제317 수송비행단 제39 수송비행대대에 배치되었다.
사고기는 인수 후 4년 9개월간 2,551시간을 비행했으며 2,758회의 이착륙을 했다. 또한 사고 5개월 전인 2015년 4월 24일에 정기점검을 받았지만 이상은 없었다.
이후 사고기는 사고 직전에 작전을 위해 아프가니스탄에 파견되었으며, 작전을 위해 아프가니스탄 바그람 기지와 칸다하르 기지에서 주둔하고 있는 미 공군 제455 원정비행단의 제774 원정수송 비행대대에 임시로 배치되었다.
3. 조종사/탑승자 정보
사고 당시 사고기에는 미 공군 소속 조종사 2명(기장, 부기장), 화물 적재 담당자(로드마스터) 2명, 미군 2명과 군수회사 소속 민간인 5명 등 총 11명이 탑승해 있었다.
<왼쪽: 조던 기장, 오른쪽: 조나단 부기장>
사고 당시 기장은 조던 B. 피어슨 대위(Jordan B. Pierson, 28세)이다.
조던 기장의 총 비행시간은 1,193시간으로, 이 중 사고 기종인 C-130J의 비행시간은 943시간이다.
총 비행시간에서 나머지 250시간 중 236시간 가량은 전투비행 훈련을 통해 쌓았다.
조던 기장은 사고 1년 전인 2014년 10월 9일에 기장으로 승급했으며, 추천을 받아 비행교관이 되기 위한 교육을 받기도 했다.
사고 당시 사고기의 조종을 담당했던 부기장은 조나단 골든 대위(Jonathan J. Golden, 33세)이다.
조나단 부기장의 총 비행시간은 2,750시간으로, 이 중 사고 기종인 C-130J의 비행시간은 338시간이다. 31.5시간의 전투훈련 비행을 받았다.
Jonathan was in the process of upgrading to become the C-130J captain at the time of the accident.
On the other hand, Jonathan had spent 2,164 hours flying the E-8C Joint Stars (Early Warning Control System based on the Boeing 707) before flying the C-130J.
Pictures of Ryan (left) and Queen (right)
Two cargo loaders were Ryan D. Hammond (age 26) and Quinn L. Johnson-Harris (age 21). ( * US forces are from navy to navy)
<On the left is Corporal Nathan, and on the right is a photo of Kcey.>
The two soldiers who boarded the room were members of the USFK called the Fly-Away Security Team (FAST). They are transported to and from the transport, and after landing they protect the transport, passengers and cargo from the ground. These were Corporal Nathan C. Sartain (29) and Kcey E. Ruiz (21).
Meanwhile, five civilians from the military company were on board. (Four Americans, one Kyrgyzstan)
4. Flight Overview
On October 1, 2015, on the eve of the accident, the aircraft will be assigned to carry the cargo to and from the Jalalabad airport, Kabul airport (Afghan capital) and Kandahar International airport, respectively, starting from Afghanistan Bagram Air Force Base.
The crasher was given the call sign "TORQUE 62 (torque 62)".
At 7:30 pm local time in Afghanistan, pilots and crew members arrive at the Bagram Air Force Base Operations Center to discuss the risks (such as attacks by terrorist groups) during mission operations. They begin preparations for flight after determining that the assigned mission flight is a low-risk mission.
Prior to the flight, the pilots were briefed on the mission with the night tactical chief, and during the briefing, they checked the amount of fuel and confirmed the NOTAM, the cargo load plan, and weather information.
<The US Air Force's C-130H transport aircraft is given to Yokota US military bases. Not an accident>
After about 50 minutes of flight preparation, the prepared pilots arrive at the operation center at 8:20 am, armed with equipment such as night vision goggles (NVG) and boarded in the crash. The night vision was in a black box below.
<Helmet type night vision worn by pilots>
First flight
At 9:36 pm, the crasher (62th Torque) flew over the Bagram Air Force Base to the Jalalabad airport for the first mission. Jonathan was in charge and Jordan was in charge of overseeing Jonathan.
But the crasher was hit by a bird strike that collided with the bird shortly after takeoff. The pilots then return to check the aircraft and land at Bagram Air Force Base at 9:55 pm and give it to the plenary. The pilots commissioned a mechanic to repair the aircraft and said they would leave the plane and go to the operations center to continue the mission. Once confirmed by the mechanics, the pilots will fly again to take off at 10:53 pm and head for Jalalabad airport.
After a short flight of about 130km and a flight of 20 minutes, the accident arrives at Jalalabad airport at 11:13:18 pm.
<Jalalabad airport satellite picture>
After landing, the pilots report to the control tower that they saw fireworks around the runway. After that, the pilots move to the main area at 11:16 to start the checklist for cargo unloading and prepare to unload the cargo.
<US Air Force's unloading of C-130 cargo>
Instead of loading and unloading the cargo with the engine turned off, the pilots decide to load / unload (ERO, Engine Running Onload / Offload) the cargo with the engine turned on.
CAP: ERO checklist, clear ramp and door.
Captain: ERO checklist, No obstacle around lamp door.
COP: ERO checklist, APU is spinning.
Attaché: ERO checklist, APU (auxiliary power unit) in operation.
COP: Crew briefing.
Assistant: Start the briefing.
CAP: ERO through the ramp and door, 6 off.
Length: Perform ERO (cargo loading / unloading with engine turned on) with (rear) lamp door, 6th off.
COP: Clear on the right, I'll watch the K-loader. Should be far enough back though?
Commander: No obstacles on the right, I'll take a look at the K loader. Will there be enough space?
(Discussion on APU)
COP: Still clear on the right, plenty clear, (...) cargo door open, ready inboards?
Assistant: No obstacles on the right. Cargo door open, ready?
(syncopation)
조종사들은 화물실 문을 개방하고, 기장은 로드마스터(화물적재 담당자)에게 무전을 하여 화물을 하역해도 된다고 알린다.
CAP: Parking brake's set, clear to offload.
기장: 파킹 브레이크 설정, 이제 화물을 하역하셔도 됩니다.
ML1: Roger that.
로드마스터: 알겠습니다.
FAST 경비원들은 비행기에서 내려 경비를 시작하고, 조종사들은 연료량을 점검하고 비행시간을 체크한다.
화물 적재와 승강타
화물 하기가 시작된 지 1~2분 후인 11시 19분 50초, 로드마스터가 조종사들에게 무전을 해 승강타를 좀 올려 달라고 부탁한다.
ML1: Hey, uh, do you mind raising up... what is it? The elevator in the back?
로드마스터: 이봐요, (승강타를 보고는) 이게 뭐지... 뒤쪽에 승강타를 좀 올려 주실 수 있나요?
CAP: Yup, got it.
기장: 네, 알겠습니다.
ML1: Cool, thanks.
로드마스터: 좋아요. 감사한다.
C-130J의 승강타는 조종간이 중립 상태에 놓여 있으면 왼쪽 사진처럼 약 15도 정도 내려가 있다. 이러한 상태에서는 높이가 높은 화물들을 하역시킬 때에 어려움이 따르기 때문에, 로드마스터가 오른쪽 사진처럼 승강타를 올려 달라고 부탁한 것이다.
기장은 로드마스터의 부탁에 따라, 조종간을 직접 손으로 당겨 승강타를 올려준다.
야간투시경 상자
기장은 11시 19분경부터 11시 26분까지 약 6분 동안 조종간을 당기고 있었다. 기장이 직접 손으로 조종간을 당기고 있었기 때문에 승강타의 타각은 6~13도 내외를 계속 움직였으며, 기장의 몸의 움직임에 따라 조종간이 기울어지자 에일러론도 따라서 작동했다.
그런데 블랙박스에 따르면, 승강타의 타각이 11시 26분 6초에 갑자기 20도까지 증가했다가 약 7도에서 완전히 고정된다. (위 사진의 파란색 원)
그 이유는 바로 손을 쓰지 않고도 조종간이 당겨져 있도록 위치시키기 위해, 기장이 계기판과 조종간 사이에 야간투시경 상자를 끼워 넣었기 때문이었다. 이는 조종사들의 블랙박스 대화내용에서도 확인된다.
CAP: (Groans) My NVG case is holding…the elevator.
기장: (신음소리) 야간투시경 상자로 승강타를 올려 놨어.
COP: (Laughs) Well done, sir. Well done. (Laughs)
부기장: (웃으며) 잘 했어. 껄껄껄.
부기장이 웃으면서 대답하는 것으로 보아, 부기장은 기장의 이러한 테크닉이 참신했던 모양이다.
이후 기장과 부기장은 계속해서 잡담을 나눴으며, 부기장은 11시 36분경에 조종실을 나가 화물 적재 작업을 돕는다.
사고기의 화물칸에는 총 5개, 18톤의 팔레트가 실린다.
<C-130J 화물기의 화물실 내부. 전방 좌석에는 로드마스터와 같은 승무원 신분의 탑승자가 탑승했으며, 후방 좌석에는 FAST 보안요원과 민간인 등 승객 신분의 탑승자가 탑승했다.>
한편 부기장이 자리를 비운 사이, 기장과 로드마스터는 변경된 무게중심과 이륙절차 등에 대해 논의한다.
After 12:00 am, the date is now October 2. The vice-captain returns to the cockpit at 12:02. The captain says that the engine thrust will use the AMAX (Adjustable Maximum Output) mode when take-off, and the take-off speed is 111 knots.
After a while, the Road Master informs him that he has finished loading the cargo.
ML1: Alright, we're loaded.
Road Master: Yes, the cargo has been loaded.
CAP: Cool. Ready to go?
Captain: All right. Are you ready?
The pilots then examine the takeoff speed, takeoff procedures, and emergency procedures.
But the pilots had forgotten one thing. It was the fact that the captain interposed the night vision box between the controls in order to ease the elevator during the cargo loading process.
A typical flight checklist includes a Flight controls check to ensure that the controls are working properly after the engine has been started and the controls are moved. However, as previously mentioned, accident pilot pilots had to go through the ERO procedure to unload and load cargo without turning off the engine. This ERO checklist did not contain a procedure to check the normal operation of the controls.
Ground movement
At 12:09:28 am, the vice-captain calls the Jalalabad airport control tower to ask for taxiing and advises him to do a tactical climb (to avoid threats on the ground).
12:09:28, COP: JAF tower, Torque 62 requests taxi for runway 31, (...) tactical departure up to 14-5, Bravo Sector.
Commander: Jalalabad Control Tower, Talk 62. We will ask for ground movement to runway 31, and we will have a tactical rise to 14,500 feet.
12:09:42, TWR: Torque 62 roger, runway 31, back taxi full length, line up and wait.
Control tower: Yes. Please move to runway 31 and arrange at the end and wait.
12:09:48, COP: Torque 62, back taxi to 31 will line up and wait, ramp open.
(Read instructions)
At 12:10, pilots and roadmaster share cargo and other stories. After that, pilots complete the departure briefing. The captain then confirms who of the two load masters is connected to the headset connected to him, confirms that the cargo door is closed, and then continues the ERO checklist.
(Omitted, perform ERO checklist ...)
ML1: Brake check.
Load master: Break check.
CAP: Alright, brake check. Does that work for you?
Captain: Yes, brake check, are you satisfied?
ML2: (...) good.
Road Master: Good.
ML1: She's good. We're solid.
Road Master: (The break condition is fine).
CAP: Cool.
Captain: All right.
COP: Cool. Low speed ground idle switches are normal, APU is shutting down, flaps set 50, trim is set ... defensive ... operate and manual.
Assistant: Good. Ground speed low speed, engine output minimum, switch normal, APU off and flap 50 degrees. Trim (horizontal tail wing) setting, defense ... manual steering (?) (Presumably speaking of evasive maneuver).
COP: ERO checks.
Assistant: ERO check.
ML1: Complete load.
Load master: Load completed.
The pilots review the elevation angle after takeoff and complete the ERO checklist.
COP: Copilot. I did not look up the pitch attitude, do you want me to go up to 15?
Commander: I have not looked up the elevation angle yet. Do you want 15?
CAP: Yup, 15 will be good.
Captain: Yes, I would like 15 degrees.
COP: Roger. Alright, ERO checks are complete.
Commander: It is. Complete ERO checklist.
(syncopation)
CAP: Cool.
Captain: All right.
(syncopation)
Takeoff clearance
The officer will carry out the checklist, and the captain will tell the control tower to inform that the takeoff is ready.
COP: It's about 1945. And you're clear on the right.
Deputy: The current time is about 19:45 UTC. Right Clear.
CAP: Cool. Call ready.
Captain: All right. I'm ready to take off.
<The accident that was filmed in Britain on July 27, 2014, a year before the accident>
According to the captain's instructions, the vice-captain calls the Jalalabad airport control tower at 12:14:32 and says that the takeoff is ready. The control tower permits takeoff at 12:14:37.
12:14:32, COP: JAF tower, Torque 62 is ready for takeoff 31.
부기장: 잘랄라바드 관제탑, 토크 62기이다. 31번 활주로에서 이륙 준비 완료.
12시 14분 37초, TWR: Torque 62, very well, runway 31 wind 220 at 3, cleared for takeoff.
관제탑: 토크 62기, 좋습니다. 31번 활주로의 풍향은 220도, 풍속은 3노트이다. 이륙을 허가합니다.
12시 14분 43초, COP: Torque 62 cleared for takeoff 31.
(부기장이 지시사항 복창)
이륙 허가를 받자, 조종사들은 가속도 체크 시점을 논의한다. 이것은 이륙활주를 시작한 후 기체가 정상적으로 속도를 내는 지 확인하는 절차이다.
COP: Oh, you know what I did not brief is acceleration check time.
부기장: 아, 가속도 체크 시간을 브리핑에서 빼먹었군.
CAP: Can you get the hack on that?
기장: 자네가 측정할래?
COP: Yup, 24 seconds, we're looking for 100 knots and at least 97.
부기장: 그래, 이륙활주 개시 24초 뒤에 속도가 최소 97노트(180km/h), 100노트(185km/h)는 될 거야.
CAP: Cool.
기장: 좋아.
(중략, 기장과 로드마스터와의 대화)
이륙활주 직전, 기장과 부기장은 서로의 역할에 대해 다시 한번 확인한다.
CAP: Copilot's controls.
기장: 부기장이 조종.
COP: Copilot's controls, your nose wheel steering. Power is coming in, we are cleared for takeoff 1945, power is set.
Vice: The vice-captain is the pilot, the captain is the front-wheel steering. Engine output. I am allowed to take off, and the current time is 19:45 UTC. Engine output setting completed.
CAP: Power checks.
Cap: Check engine output.
40 seconds after takeoff clearance 12:15:24, torque 62 starts to run on the 31st runway at Jalalabad airport.
The captain was still forgotten that there was a night vision box in front of his cockpit.
Because it was difficult to identify objects in the cockpit at night because there was no light at night, and the instruments (altimeter, speedometer, orientation indicator, etc.) that pilots used mainly were located in the HUD (head up display) located at the cockpit window, It was difficult to identify the anomaly unless you looked carefully at the front gauge where the box was placed. (If you overlap with the control as shown in the picture above, it is more difficult to identify)
<HUD instrument panel mounted in front of the US Air Force's C-130 cockpit window (windshield)
12:15:24, COP: And hack.
Assistant: Start measuring time.
12:15:42, COP: Copilot's controls, let me know when you're off.
Deputy Commander: Controlled by the assistant commander, tell me when you take off.
12:15:45, CAP: Co's controls ... yup, I'm not t -... I'm just touching ... not ...
Captain: Steering officer, yes, I will not touch the joystick.
12:15:47, COP: Okay, roger.
Assistant: Yes, I see.
12:15:48, CAP: Not contolling.
take-off
However, 22 seconds after the start of the take-off, when the runway was running at a speed of 95 knots (176 km / h) at 12:15:46, the aircraft began to rush freely, even though the pilots did not manipulate the controls.
At 12:15:49, after 24 seconds of take off, the assistant officer checks the acceleration and confirms that there is no abnormality in speed.
12:15:49, COP: 24 seconds.
Assistant: 24 sec.
<Capture of flying animation restructured with black box>
At 12:15:50, 62 Torque flys off the runway at 107.5 knots (199 km per hour).
At the same time, the captain instructs him to raise the nose. When the rider stepped up before the usual take-off speed (111 knots, 206 km / h), the captain thought that the vice-president raised the nose too quickly and said, "I raised the rider a little sooner."
12:15:50, CAP: Rotate.
Captain: Raise the rider.
12:15:52, CAP: You're a little early.
Captain: You've raised the rider a little bit soon.
So the vice-captain says that the plane has taken off.
12:15:54, COP: It's going off on its own.
Commander: Is the plane taking off?
Abnormal detection
Six seconds after take-off, the vice-president notices something strange and exasperates. The assistant officer judged that the self-lifted aircraft was due to more than the horizontal tail wing angle (trim), so he lowered the nose from +1 to raise the nose with the horizontal tail wing trim to lower the nose, Trim failure ".
하지만 트림 장치는 이상이 없었으며, 트림은 부기장의 조작대로 정상적으로 움직였다.
12시 15분 56초, COP: Ahh XXX
부기장: 아아아 (욕설)
12시 15분 58초, COP: Trim failure.
부기장: 트림 고장이야.
토크 62기의 기수는 13.5도까지 올라간다. 이 때의 속도는 117노트(217km/h), 고도는 90피트(27미터)였다.
기장도 뭔가 잘못된 것을 눈치채고 비상용 트림을 설정하라고 지시한다.
12시 15분 59초, CAP: Here, go emergency.
기장: 자네, 비상트림을 설정해.
12시 16분 0초, CAP: Go emergency.
기장: 비상 트림을 설정해.
이 때, 기체의 기수는 20도까지 올라가고 고도는 약 100피트(30미터)였다. 기수는 계속해서 올라간다.
기장은 부기장으로부터 조종간을 넘겨받고 조종을 시작한다.
실속
기체가 계속해서 급상승을 하자, 결국 토크 62기는 속도가 계속해서 떨어져 실속 상태에 빠지기 시작한다. 이륙 11초 후인 12시 16분 1초, ACAWS(경보장치)가 실속 경고음(STALL)을 내기 시작한다.
이 때의 속도는 115노트(214km/h), 받음각은 10도 이상이었다.
12시 16분 1초, ACAWS: STALL
12시 16분 2초, 기체는 완전히 실속에 빠진다. 부기장은 비상 트림이라고 말한다. (미 공군의 보고서에 따르면 조종사들의 "Emergency"라는 발언이 비상 트림을 의미하는 것이라고 설명하고 있다.)
12시 16분 2초, COP: Emergency.
부기장: 비상 트림.
12시 16분 3초, ACAWS: STALL
At the time of the second stall warning sound at 12:16:03, the nose angle of the gas was up to 35 degrees . The angle of attack was 15 degrees and the speed rose to 105.5 knots (195 km / h) and the altitude to 282 feet (86 meters).
Just before the second stall beep sounded, the stick pusher acted (mechanically pushing the rope down to reduce the stall by lowering the rope), but because the stick was physically stuck in the box, There was no.
At 12:16:05, the captain instructs the assistant officer to operate the emergency trim switch, and tells him that he will steer again.
12:16:05, CAP: Hey! Go emergency, pilot's controls.
Captain: You manipulate the emergency trim! I'll steer.
12:16:06, COP: It's in emergency.
Assistant: (Trim is now) Emergency mode.
At 12:16:06, Torque 62 reaches 550 feet (167 meters) and begins to fall. At this time, the speed dropped to 80 knots (148 km / h) and the angle of attack reached 20 degrees.
At 12:16:07, another stall warning beep sounds. At this time, the torque 62 rises to a whopping 42 degrees, and now the rider falls sharply and leaps to the right rapidly. The captain tried to reduce the tilt by tilting the stick to the left, but the effect was minimal because he was already stalled.
12:16:07, ACAWS: STALL, STALL.
12:16:09, COP: Pilot's controls. (Reaffirming that the captain has control)
12:16:10, CAP: Pilot's controls.
When the gas leaps to the right suddenly, the captain speaks out swearing words. At this point, the gas leaned to the right to a whopping 75 degrees.
Since then, the captain continues to speak out.
12:16:11, CAP: Oh XXX
Captain: Uh-huh.
12:16:12, ACAWS: RIGHT RUDDER
12:16:12, CAP: Oh XXX
Captain: (swearing)
12:16:13, CAP: Hey XXX
Captain: Hey, (swearing)
fall
At 12:16:13, the gas now begins to decline to the left again. But the rider goes down and goes down to -28 degrees at 12:16:15.
Roadmaster asks what is happening.
12:16:14, ML2: What's going on?
Road Master: What's going on?
In reply to the Road Master, the captain says "I'm going down" three times. (One of these three statements is sent to the tower)
12:16:15, CAP: Hey, were going down. We're going down.
Captain: Hey, we're going down. I'm going down.
The rider began to climb back up, but the altitude was too low to prevent the crash.
At 12:16:16, the WHOOP WHOOP PULL UP sound starts to ring.
12:16:16, ACAWS: WHOOP WHOOP ...
12:16:17, CAP: We're going down.
Captain: It will fall.
fall
Twenty-eight seconds after takeoff, at 12:16:18, torque 62 crashed at a speed of 111.5 knots (206 km / h) at the Jalalabad airport watch tower.
At the time of the crash, the nadir angle was -14 degrees and the slope was tilted to the right by 28 degrees, and the descent rate reached -8,000 feet per minute.
All 11 passengers will die.
<Animated screenshots of video clips like video>
Fire Evolution / Rescue Work
The controller of the control tower who witnessed the crash, will issue an alarm at 12:16:20. The Jalalabad Airport Fire Brigade receives a warning at 12:16:24.
The airport staff members who witnessed the fall rushed to the scene of the crash and participated in the rescue. They found a soldier who was severely wounded in the Afghan Special Response Military Observatory (photo above) Take it.
The fire department orders 2 fire trucks, 2 water tank cars and 1 ambulance at 12:17:17, and five emergency vehicles are dispatched at 12:18:05.
The fire brigade arrived at the scene of the accident at about 12:35, 17 minutes after the departure, because the entry was delayed due to the traffic congestion and the airport access procedure and because the iron gate at the airport was very small.
Meanwhile, a rescued Afghan soldier was taken to the hospital but died.
The fire brigade evolved more than 90% of the fire at 5 am, about four hours after dispatch. In the search process, the bodies of one Afghan army were taken away with 11 crew members. This resulted in a total of 14 deaths from accidents. (11 passengers killed, three Afghan soldiers killed on the ground)
Broken trees due to an accident
Photo of the cargo door (lamp)
Surveillance towers and casualties in Afghanistan
Photograph of engine debris.
On the next day of the accident, on October 3, a memorial ceremony was held for six US soldiers who died due to an accident (Source: US Air Force, photographer: Senior Airman Cierra Presentado)
US troops salute to honor dead people (source: US Air Force, photographer: Senior Airman Cierra Presentado)
5. Accident investigation
Upon occurrence of an accident, the Air Corps Air Traffic Control Commission immediately commences an accident investigation. Except for the tail, the accident was burned by fire.
Investigators took two black boxes (FDR and cockpit voice recorder (CVR)) from the debris and read them, and started to analyze the lift system and the engine from the tail. We also read the CCTV at the airport, and we also surveyed weather information and accident maintenance records.
On the day of the incident, the Taliban insisted on Twitter that their Islamic warriors shot down the US C-130, but the US military ruled that the Taliban's claim was unreliable and excluded the early attack.
At the time of the accident, the wind was blowing very weakly (3 knots) and the visibility was over 9,000 meters, so weather factors are excluded from the cause of the accident.
As a result of analyzing the black box (FDR), there was no major abnormality in the engine system of the accident machine. According to the maintenance records, the temperature of the 4th engine was higher than that of the other 3 engines, but the temperature of the black box and CCTV was within normal operating range. The engine is determined not to be the cause of the accident.
There was no abnormality in the hydraulic device.
Analysis of the data of the FDR and the contents of the conversation with the pilot of the CVR revealed that the pilots had trouble controlling the elevator at the time of the accident, (The horizontal tail wing trim, which the accident pilots thought was broken, worked properly)
As a result of investigating the elevator rubble, elevators were not at all abnormal.
However, the FDR data indicated that the elevator angle was fixed at an angle that raised the nose from before the takeoff.
So why was the elevator so unsteadily fixed? The secret was to be found in the pilots' conversations during the loading of the cargo before takeoff.
According to the CVR, the captain was pulling up the elevator to pull the joystick to facilitate loading, upon request from the Roadmaster. From 11:26 onwards, elevator angles were fixed at unchanged angles as before the takeoff, consistent with the point that the captain said "I put the night vision box in the cockpit".
CAP: (Groans) My NVG case is holding ... the elevator.
Captain: (moaning) I put the elevator in the night vision box.
MCP: (Laughs) Well done, sir. Well done. (Laughs)
Assistant: (laughing) Good work. Cough.
Investigators continued to listen to the CVR conversation, but after that, the pilots did not mention the night vision box at all. In other words, the captain forgot to put a night vision box in the pilot and he went on a flight, and because the night vision box was fixed in the direction of raising the jockey, the accident machine did not lower the jockey,
Of course, if I did this in bright sunlight, I would have left the box before the takeoff, because the box was visible in the pilot's cabin, but because it was a dark night at the time of the accident, pilots were not able to see through the night vision box .
The pilots were wearing night vision goggles, but at the time of the accident there was not much moonlight, so the brightness was not enough.
In addition, since the viewing angle is limited when the night vision goggle is worn, it would be more difficult to secure visibility and to judge the situation.
After investigating the contents of the black box, the investigating committee conducted the same experiment using the actual C-130J cargo and night vision box, confirming that the elevator was fixed at about the same angle as the time of the accident.
6. Conclusion
About seven months after the accident, on April 14, 2016, the US Air Force Flight Accident Investigation Commission issued an accident investigation report saying, "An accident occurred when the captain attempted to take off while inserting a night vision box into the cockpit. "He said. That was the pilot's fault.
In addition, the committee reported that the pilots did not specifically talk about the flight system problems they had experienced during the accident flight, and that the rider did not reduce the engine power and did inappropriate actions even after the take-off. He said.
7. Memorial Facilities
The Bagram Air Force Base, which was the starting point of Torque 62, depicts murals commemorating six soldiers who died in an accident.
Finally,
A scene of an accident that landed at Nellis Air Force Base, USA on May 18, 2011, four years before the accident.
3-line summary
1. The C-130 transport must have the elevator raised to accommodate tall cargoes in the cargo hold.
2. The captain puts the box in the joystick to see if it was troublesome to pull the joystick up the elevator
3. I forgot to put the box and tried to take off, but after a sharp rise, I stumbled down and all 11 passengers and three soldiers on the ground were killed
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